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However, the statute places in a court of justice final arbitration and
leaves it to decide whether such applicant is a law-abiding citizen.
Things Other Than the Morality of Applicants and Threatened
Nuisance in the Absence of Zoning Regulations
The decisive question here is whether, in the absence of zoning
restrictions, the county court may consider other matters which
could have a bearing on the granting of the permit. As previously
stated, the court cannot flatly and arbitrarily decide that drive-ins are
not a good thing for the community. On the other hand, it is clear
that the court should take into consideration factors other than the
morality of the applicant. This brings us to the crucial question of
whether the court may refuse to grant the permit on consideration of
conditions which would not amount to a nuisance per se or would not
necessarily constitute a nuisance under the particular circumstances.
When the court comes to consider such a matter as the location of
the particular business and decides the merits on such factors as loca-
tion on a main highway or location on a street where traffic speed is
low, or location apart from industrial and residential neighborhoods
or similar areas, it is properly exercising its administrative or quasi-
judicial function, and in doing so it has very broad discretion. The
necessary conclusion, then, is that the court may consider such other
circumstances which do not amount to a nuisance in arriving at a
decision. It is suggested only that the court should weigh the evidence
carefully and find on the basis of the location of the drive-in that it is
dangerous to public safety or health before refusing to issue a permit.
The court should have a genuine and valid reason for refusal and must
not decide flatly, on the application of the people of the vicinity, that
drive-ins are a bad thing for the community and should not be per-
mitted to operate. It is submitted that such a denial is unconstitutional
as an unreasonable regulation of the applicant's right to use his prop-
erty as he sees fit, as well as grossly unfair to a prospective business-
man who wishes to carry on a legitimate business which the public
has sanctioned throughout the United States.
THoms A. MrrGElL
APPELLATE PROCEDURE-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT IN
KENTUCKY-INJUNCTIONS AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Kentucky Revised Statutes, section 21.060, provides as follows:
(1) Appeals may be taken to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from all
final orders and judgments of circuit courts in civil cases except:
NoTms
(a) Judgments where the value of the amount or thing in controversy
is less than $2500.00, exclusive of interest and costs;
(b) That portion of a judgment granting a divorce;
(c) Judgments punishing contempts;
(d) Bonds having the force of judgments.
(2) If the value of the amount of thing in controversy, exclusive of interest and
costs, is as much as two hundred dollars, the Court of Appeals may grant an
appeal from the judgment or final order of a circuit court when:
(a) It is satisfied from the record that the ends of justice require that
the judgment appealed from be reversed; or
(b) The correct decision of a case cannot be had without construing a
statute or section of the constitution put in issue in the case.
(3) Unless otherwise authorized by statute or code, no appeal shall be taken to
the Court of Appeals from any order or judgment of any county, quarterly,
police, fiscal or justice's court. (1952, c. 24, Sec. 1; effective June 19, 1952)
In order that- this discussion may be better understood, section
21.060, as it existed prior to its amendment in 1952, is set out below:
(1) Appeals may be taken to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from
all final orders and judgments of circuit courts in cases directly involv-
ing the title to land, the right to an easement therein, or the right
to enforce a statutory lien thereon, and from final orders and judgments in
all other civil cases except:
(a) Judgments for the recovery of money or personal property, or any
interest therein, or to enforce any lien thereon, where the value in
controversy is less than five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and
costs;
(b) That portion of a judgment granting a divorce;
(c) Judgments punishing contempts;
(d) Bonds having the force of judgments.
(2) If the value of the amount or thing in controversy, exclusive of interest and
costs, is as much as two hundred dollars, the Court of Appeals may grant
an appeal from the judgment or final order of a circuit court when:
(a) It is satisfied from the record that the ends of justice require that
the judgment appealed from be reversed; or
(b) The correct decision of a case cannot be had without construing a
statute or section of the constitution put in issue in the case.
(3) Unless otherwise authorized by statute or code, no appeal shall be taken to
the Court of Appeals from any order or judgment of any county, quarterly,
police, fiscal or justice's court.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky ever since its creation has been
plagued with an excessive docket. To avoid this, various measures
have been adopted. Effective January 1, 1895, the number of judges
on the Court of Appeals was increased to seven. Three years later the
$100.00 minimum amount required for appellate review in cases in-
volving the recovery of money or personal property was raised to
$200.00. In 1906, legislation authorizing the appointment of one com-
missioner was enacted. The crowded docket conditions still persisted,
and in 1914 the appeals limits were again raised, this time to $500.00,
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with the provision that "... in cases involving as much as $200.00 and
less than $500.00 an appeal might be prayed, and the courts should
grant it when the ends of justice should require a reversal or a ques-
tion involving the construction of a statute or section of the Constitu-
tion should be in issue."1 In this same legislation appeals allowed as
a matter of right in land cases were also restricted to those cases di-
rectly involving the title to land, the right to an easement therein, or
the right to enforce a statutory lien thereon. Finally, in 1928, the num-
ber of commissioners authorized was increased to four, and in 1952,
the appellate amount necessary for the Court of Appeals to review a
case was again raised to the present amount of $2500.00.2
The purpose of the 1952 amendment evidently was two-fold. In
the first place, the Legislature increased the amount which must be
involved to appeal certain actions to the Court of Appeals from $500.00
to $2500.00. Secondly, the General Assembly enlarged the classes of
actions in which a jurisdictional amount must be shown in order to
appeal. It is this second change in the law with which this discussion
will be primarily concerned.
Prior to 1952, in order to appeal from a judgment of a circuit court,
it was necessary to show the existence of a minimum jurisdictional
amount only in actions involving the recovery of money or personal
property and in actions asserting an interest in or a lien upon money
or personalty. Under the statute as amended, it has seemingly become
necessary to show a jurisdictional amount in all appeals to the Court
of Appeals, except where expressly authorized as a matter of right by
the statute.
The Court of Appeals will have no difficulty in interpreting this
statute when called upon to decide the jurisdictional point in cases in-
volving title to land, the right of an easement in land, or the right to
enforce a statutory lien thereon, for these were specifically omitted
from the wording of the statute. Nor will the court have any dif-
ficulty where the recovery of a money judgment or personal property
is involved, for it is quite clear that the jurisdictional amount must be
present in order to appeal to the court in these cases. The difficulty
will arise in interpreting the words "value of the amount or thing in
controversy,"3 when the appeal before the court involves an injunction
or declaratory judgment. Therefore the remainder of this discussion
will be devoted to this problem.
Did the Legislature intend to eliminate from appellate review in-
junction or declaratory judgment cases where the "value of the amount
'Eblen, An" Intolerable Burden, 40 Ky. LJ. 78, at 79 (1951).
2 Ibid.
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 21.060 (1952).
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or thing in controversy" cannot be established? The determination of
one s "rights," in either a declaratory judgment or an injunctive pro-
ceeding, and the placing of a monetary value on these rights are two
distinct things. In the determination of one's legal rights, the court
is governed by certain accepted legal principles. On the other hand,
what guide, standard or principle does the court have to measure the
"value of the amount or thing in controversy" for purposes of appeal?
True, the Legislature thought that this problem would be eliminated
by Kentucky Revised Statute section 21.070,4 which provides a means
whereby any litigant may require a circuit court to state in its judg-
ment "the actual value in controversy" which shall be conclusive of
the amount in controversy for purposes of appeal. But here again, the
circuit court would be presented with the same problem of determining
what yardstick to use in determining the value of the amount or thing
in controversy in an injunction or declaratory judgment proceeding.
Furthermore, if the circuit court, through some fallacious reasoning
or arbitrary judgment, placed a value on the "amount or thing" which
was less than the jurisdictional amount required for the purposes of
appeal, with what remedy would the injured party be left? In an
effort to better understand the problem, it is convenient first to analyze
it from the standpoint of injunctions, and, second, from the standpoint
of declaratory judgments.
"It is axiomatic that injunctive relief will not be granted unless the
plaintiff shows that he will suffer great and irreparable injury for which
he has no adequate remedy at law."5 Furthermore, an injunction can-
not be granted if the injury can be adequately compensated in dam-
ages.0 Thus, to seek an injunction seemingly negatives the possibility
of placing a value on the amount or thing in controversy. Under the
provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 21.060 prior to 1952,
the Court of Appeals held that an appeal would lie from a judgment
granting an injunction regardless of the amount involved; 7 but this
was for the reason that the statute at that time required a showing of a
minimum jurisdictional amount for an appeal only in cases involving
money, personal property or an interest therein.8  Since the 1952
'Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 21.070 provides: "If a judgment does not, when con-
strued in connection with the pleadings, certainly fix the value of the amount or
thing in controversy, the court shall, upon the request of either party, state in thejudgment the actual value in controversy, and the valuation shall be conclusive
of the amount in controversy for the purpose of appeal."
'Morrow v. Louisville, 249 S.W. 2d 721 (Ky. 1952).
'Newton v. Farris, 183 Ky. 288, 209 S.W. 38 (1919).
'McKim v. Smith, 249 Ky. 835, 172 S.W. 2d 634 (1943); Merchants Whole-
sale Grocery Company v. Frankfort, 244 S.W. 2d 468 (Ky. 1951); Kentucky Un-
employment Compensation Commission v. Chenault & Orear 295 Ky. 562, 174
S.W. 2d 767 (1943); Charos v. Jent, 293 Ky. 50, 168 S.W. 2A 334 (1943).8Shackelford v. Phillips, 112 Ky. 563, 66 S.W. 419 (1902).
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amendment to section 21.060, the court has decided the case of Bra-
shear v. Payne.9 The court held that, due to a change in the language
of the statute, a jurisdictional amount must be shown in order to
appeal from an action involving an injunction. In the Brashear case,
speaking of the 1952 amendment to section 21.060, the court said:
The amendment makes material changes; it narrows the scope of ap-
pealable cases, and places a higher limitation on the amount involved
necessary to give appellate jurisdiction. It allows, as a matter of right,
appeals in 'all civil cases,' except from judgments 'where the value
of the amount or thing in controversy is less than twenty-five hundred
dollars, exclusive of interests and costs,' and then classifies other non-
appealable cases. The section eliminates the words 'money or per-
sonal property,' thus making it apply to all civil cases, save those
specifically excepted. (Emphasis supplied by writer) 10
Following this concise explanation of the effect of the 1952 amend-
ment, the court dismissed the appeal from a judgment denying an
injunction because the record failed to reveal the existence of the
minimum jurisdictional amount.
If the Legislature did intend to eliminate from appellate review
those cases where the "value of the amount or thing" cannot be estab-
lished, other than by the arbitrary method of forcing the trial judge to
place a value on it without the aid of a logical yardstick, then the
words "appeals may be taken... as a matter of -right from all... civil
cases. . . " are completely meaningless. It would have been more
logical, had this been the intent of the Legislature, for the statute to
have read as follows:
Appeals may be taken to the Court of' Appeals as a matter of right
from all final orders and judgments of circuit courts in civil cases where
the value of the amount or thing in controversy is $2500.00 or more,
exclusive of interest and costs, except from that portion of a judgment
granting a divorce, judgment punishing contempts, and bonds having
the force of a judgment....
It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that a statute
is to be construed so that all sections of it are to have a meaning. This
being true, what meaning can be attached to the clause of the statute
which says "appeals may be taken.., as a matter of right from all...
civil cases... ."? Under the court's interpretation of the statute in the
Brashear case, the clause "value of the amount or thing in controversy"
is all embracing and covers all possible types of civil cases So far, the
Court of Appeals has had but one other opportunity to construe the
phrase "thing in controversy," other than the Brashear case. The court,
in the case of Choctow 0. & G. R. Co. v. Loper Brothers,"' had oc-
266 S.W. 2d 846 (Ky. 1954).10 Id. at 346.
' 6 Indian Territory Reports 482, 98 S.W. 150 (Ky. 1906).
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casion to pass on the civil jurisdiction of the United States Coinmis-
sioners appointed for the Indian Territory whose jurisdiction was ex-
clusive. In construing the Act of Congress, the court said:
.. the United States commissioners were given exclusive jurisdiction
to try all cases of whatsoever nature in civil cases, whether on contract
or tort, where the 'amount or value of the demand or of the property
or thing in controversy does not exceed $100.' We do not see how
Congress could have used language broader or plainer to show that
it was intended by the law to confer upon United States Commis-
sioners full and ample jurisdiction to try all matters exclusive of the
district court, where the demand of the plaintiff did not exceed $100,
whether the same originated in contract, grew out of personal injury,
or arose from damage to real estate. The statute divides this extensive
jurisdiction into three parts: First, where the amount or value of the
demand does not exceed $100; or, second, where the amount or value
of the property does not exceed $100; or, third, where the amount or
value of the thing in controversy does not exceed $100.... This term
"thing in controversy" certainly is broad language, and used by Con-
gress to designate any and everything which may arise in dispute
between two or more parties.. .12 (Italics supplied by writer)
Applying the foregoing definition of the phrase "thing in contro-
versy" to the present provisions of Kentucky Revised Statute section
21.060, it is seemingly apparent that regardless of the character of the
suit or the subject-matter of the litigation, no one may now appeal
as a matter of right from a final order or judgment of a circuit court
unless the judgment shows that the "amount or thing in controversy"
has a value of at least $2500.00. Nor may the court as a matter of
discretion grant an appeal unless the value in controversy amounts to
at least $200.00.
It would seem that perhaps an answer to this statutory problem
could be arrived at by an interpretation of the words used in
the statute. The word thing supplies the key to the answer for
the proper construction of the statute. Thing is defined in Webster's
dictionary as "whatever may be possessed or owned, or be the object
of a right. . . ."13 Black's Law Dictionary defines the word as "the
objects of dominion or property as contra-distinguished from persons.
The object of a right; i.e., whatever is treated by the law as the object
over which one person exercises a right, and with reference to which
another person lies under a duty." 4 From these definitions it is readily
seen that when the word thing is used in its most ordinary sense, it
applies to something corporeal-in other words, a concrete or tangible
object. Therefore, it seems highly improbable that the legislature in-
tended to use this word in its most unusual sense and to have it apply
"Id. 98 S.W. at 151.
WaBsTn's Nw IvrERNAT[oNAL DrcroziAary (2nd ed. 1944).
BL.Acx's LAw DrcrrONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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to incorporeal objects. Injunctions are prohibitory or constraining in
nature, and, as such, are directed at man's intangible equitable rights,
the object of which is incapable of valuation. Whereas in contract
and tort actions the object of the right is the monetary sum sought to
be collected, and thus, is the amount in controversy. By this interpreta-
tion, the word thing, as it appears in this statute, is not synonymous
with the word amount. Neither is it without meaning, for those actions
which concern themselves with title to land, easements, the recovery
of chattels and the various liens thereon are clearly within the meaning
of this word. By this interpretation of the word thing, in the statute,
a more coherent pattern in judicial decisions will be allowed and far
more just results will be attained.
Is the requirement of a showing of a jurisdictional amount ap-
plicable to a declaratory judgment action the same as it is to other
types of litigation under the statute in question? Basically the same
reasoning applies to declaratory judgments, in regard to the juris-
dictional amount, as it does to injunctions. But under Kentucky law
there is also a statute which provides for declaratory judgment and
gives an absolute right of appeal regardless of the amount involved.'5
Seemingly, these two statutes are in conflict. In the case of Steward v.
City of Corbin,16 the court said in an attempt to clear up this problem:
And, though it be conceded (without deciding) that this is the char-
acter of controversy for which the Declaratory Judgment Act was in-
tended to provide a remedy, that act was not intended either to en-
large or broaden the jurisdiction of this court or to affect procedure
on appeals. In Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, 2 Ed. page 223,
it is said: 'It is an axiom that the Declaratory Judgment Act has not
enlarged the jurisdiction of the courts over subject matter and parties,
although it manifestly has opened to prospective defendants-and to
plaintiffs at an early stage of the controversy-a right to petition for
relief not heretofore possessed. In that sense, it has decidedly ex-
tended the power of the courts to grant relief in cases otherwise
within their jurisdiction to pass upon. As in all cases, the court may
sua sponte raise the question of its jurisdiction over subject matter,
and consent of the parties cannot confer it.' Though the construction
of a statute is involved, the amount in controversy is less than $500.00
and a motion for an appeal must be made to this court even if the
action was properly under the Declaratory Judgment Act.10
It is pertinent to point out, however, that in the Steward case the
declaratory judgment action was filed for the sole purpose of determin-
ing whether or not a sum of money should be paid. The fact that
the suits were instituted under the Declaratory Judgment Act was im-
material since the primary purpose of the suit was recovery of a
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 418.060.
16294 Ky. 284, 171 S.W. 2d 445 (1948).
'Id. at 285, 171 S.W. 2d at 446.
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claimed indebtedness. Apparently the problem still remains as to the
construction of these two statutes where the primary purpose of the
litigation is to obtain a declaration of rights under Chapter 418 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
By the enactment of the amendment to Kentucky Revised Statute
section 21.060 in 1952, the Legislature reduced to a great extent the
number of cases which would appear on the Court of Appeals docket.
There can be no doubt that this was the primary aim of the statute and
a very commendable one. But it is submitted that if the "rights" of in-
dividual litigants in declaratory judgment suits and in injunctive pro-
ceedings, which from their very nature are not susceptible of having
a monetary value placed upon them for purposes of appeal, are to be
sacrificed in order that the court's docket may be lightened, then the
statute should be repealed or amended in order that this situation
may be remedied. If this is not done the court should overrule its
previous decision in the Brashear case and adopt the interpretation of
the statute presented by this note.
WENDELL SAx=r WMtaLvs
[Editor's note-After this note had completed the editorial process, the Court
of Appeals decided McLean v. Thurman, 273 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky., Dec. 17, 1954).
The court held that the Legislature, in amending the statute, did not intend to
deny appeals in those actions in which the amount or thing in controversy is not
translatable into a monetary valuation. The court expressly overruled the case of
Brashear v. Payne, in so far as it conflicted with the McLean decision.]
SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The purpose of this note is to examine two of the three basic
problems arising under the Fourth Amendment, namely: (1) com-
pulsory production of materials to be used solely as evidence; and (2)
the extent to which a search and seizure can be made without a war-
rant. A third problem which often arises concerns the extent of a
search and seizure as incidental to a valid arrest. This latter problem
will not be covered in this note.
(1) Compulsory Production of Materials To Be Used Solely As
Evidence.
The first important case in which the Supreme Court had occasion
to interpret the Fourth Amendment was Boyd v. United States.' This
was not technically a search and seizure case but the Court, neverthe-
less, applied the Fourth Amendment. To provide a more effective
1116 U. S. 616 (1885).
